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Abstract: These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil 
procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical evidence.  
For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes, the key determinants 
of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement costs connected to the 
rules under each regime.  The choice between arbitration and litigation should be 
made on the same basis.  The empirical literature, though sparse, suggests that 
superior governance benefits provide a significant reason for arbitration agreements.
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  This paper is based on my remarks at the 
January 2004 AALS Annual Meeting session on “Competing or Complimentary Rule Systems?  
Adjudication, Arbitration, and the Procedural World of the Future.” 
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It is difficult to talk about arbitration from a theoretical perspective without saying 
things that are equally applicable to law in general.  Much of what I will say in these 
remarks sketch out a theory of law and law enforcement, or norms and norm 
enforcement.  Arbitration can be viewed as just one special and important 
application. 
 
We can think of law as creating a web of rules within which social intercourse is 
supposed to take place.  Alternatively, you can think of law as providing a frame, 
like the frame of a building.  Either way, it is a structure, a spine, a basic set of 
parameters within which people are free to arrange their affairs. 
 
Now, once you have spun this web of rules, how do you get people to stay inside it?  
There will be individuals who will want to stick their fingers outside of the web, and 
may want to do so on a regular basis, perhaps because they get some private gain by 
refusing to stay within the structure that everyone else is abiding by.  The usual way 
of getting people to stay within the web of rules is through enforcement.  That 
typically involves setting a penalty that falls on the person who violates a norm or 
legal rule.  We can think of this as a hammer that someone holds as he stands on the 
other side of the web of rules.  When he sees a finger poke through the web, he hits it 
hard with his hammer, creating sufficient pain to deter the offender and like-minded 
others from poking their fingers through the web. 
 
Enforcement is not the only way to guarantee norm or law compliance.  We can also 
rely on repeat dealing, reputation, and reciprocity.  Someone who breaches contracts 
regularly will find that there are few others willing to trade with him.  If his potential 
associates are rational, they will take even the slightest hint that he is unreliable as a 
strong signal to keep their distance.  In the repeat-contracting setting, the norm-
violator’s conduct will bring its own punishment.  However, outside of the contract 
setting, we find other settings in which repeat dealing may not be observed.  A thief 
who burgles houses in the middle of the night does not have to worry about repeat 
dealing because success in his conduct depends on avoiding detection by others. 
 
The law itself plays a role in controlling conduct, separate and apart from the force 
or penalty applied by any enforcement authority.  While introducing the web 
metaphor, I described enforcement as if it were carried out by someone standing 
outside of the web wielding a hammer.  The law itself sets the rules, or the 
boundaries of the web.  Society might choose to change the boundaries to make it 
more or less difficult to avoid being found in violation of the law in some cases.  For 
example, if we know that the hammer wielder will catch only 50 percent of the 
norm-violators, we may want to change the norm (or law) so that it is difficult for a 
violator to avoid being found in violation.  We might reduce the number of defenses, 
or the amount of evidence necessary to prove a violation of the law.  For example, if 
we think law enforcement authorities are unlikely to catch most people engaged in 
price-fixing, we might structure the law so that there are few defenses available to 
anyone charged with price-fixing.  This is, in fact, what we see. 
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It should be clear from this description how arbitration should be described.  The 
courts, and the common law, provide the normal, or default, set of rules and 
enforcement conditions.  Arbitration provides an alternative set of rules and 
enforcement procedures.  For parties who can choose to submit their disputes to 
arbitration, they have a choice between two legal regimes, the court regime and the 
arbitration regime.  Arbitration, in effect, provides the parties with the opportunity to 
set up a different set of rules – that is, to structure a web that is shaped differently 
from that spun by the courts.  Also, arbitration provides them the opportunity to 
appoint a different hammer-wielder, one who hits harder or perhaps more softly, or 
more or less frequently, than we see under the court regime. 
 
In the remainder of these remarks, I will sketch a framework for choosing between 
alternative legal regimes.1  I will start by sketching the basic theory, and then move 
on to see whether the theory is consistent with empirical evidence.  The theory 
emphasizes two key aspects to the choice between legal regimes: governance 
benefits and enforcement costs. 
 
I. Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs 
 
Any set of rules governing interaction among private parties is likely to provide a 
benefit for which the parties are willing to pay.  For example, the simplest type of 
benefit may be coordinating their conduct, like the rules of order (i.e., who moves 
when) in a game.  More complicated and controversial rules will govern the amount 
of risk that one can impose on others.  The parties will be willing to pay an amount 
that reflects the costs saved by having rules.  A rule against breaching contracts, if 
complied with perfectly, provides an ex ante benefit equal to the expected net cost 
(i.e., loss to victim less gain to breaching party) of a breached contract.2  I will refer 
to the ex ante benefits provided by rules as governance benefits. 
 
In order to secure these benefits, the parties will have to bear some costs.  One cost is 
the cost of writing rules.  When parties rely on the common law as the source of 
rules, the cost of writing rules is bundled into the fixed costs of having courts.  Those 
costs are not borne entirely by the parties to a particular dispute because they are part 
of the general government budget, and shared by all individuals, whether litigants or 
not.  In addition to the cost of writing rules, the most significant cost borne by 
potential litigants, is the enforcement cost.  Since we are talking about private 
litigation, enforcement costs are usually the costs of litigating to enforce the rules 
governing private interaction. 
 
It follows that any set of rules governing private conduct can be described as having 
governance benefits and enforcement costs.  The courts generate rules that have clear 
governance benefits, to the extent they describe and proscribe socially undesirable 
                                                 
1 The argument is based largely on Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal 
Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209 (2000). 
2 For a richer analysis of governance benefits in the contractual context, see Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 68-84 (New York, The Free Press, 1985). 
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conduct; and enforcement costs, since the rules must be enforced by the very 
individuals who benefit from them. 
 
In settings where parties are repeat dealers, or involved in long term contracts, they 
are in a position to compare the governance benefits and enforcement costs of the 
rules governing their conduct.  They can decide whether a certain rule is too 
expensive, because the governance benefit associated with that rule is less than its 
enforcement cost.  If they decide that a particular rule is too expensive, they may 
agree among themselves to waive the rule.  If parties are rational and well informed, 
they will waive a legal rule whenever the governance benefit from the rule is less 
than the enforcement cost. 
 
Now wait a minute, you might say, why would someone who is protected by a legal 
rule waive it, merely because the expected total cost of enforcement is greater than 
the total governance benefit?  Even if the total governance benefit is less than the 
total enforcement cost, it may still be the case that for that individual who is 
protected by the rule, the governance benefit he enjoys is greater than the 
enforcement cost he would bear.  Assuming a setting of repeat dealers, there will be 
an opportunity, if transaction costs are low, for that individual to be compensated ex 
ante for waiving the rule.3  Since total welfare would be enhanced by waiving 
enforcement of the rule, there is a set of transactions that would leave all parties 
better off under an agreement that waives the rule.  This is just an application of the 
Coase theorem.4 
 
Why might the governance benefits of a legal rule fall short of its enforcement costs?  
In some cases, the harm that results from a violation is too small to justify the 
expense of going to court.  The claims could be aggregated and brought on a class-
wide basis.  Alternatively, these matters could be treated as issues that will be dealt 
with through repeat dealing, reputation, or reciprocal conduct (tit-for-tat).  In other 
cases, the likelihood of a real violation of the norm may be so small that the expected 
governance benefits of the rule are clearly less than the expected enforcement costs 
generated by frivolous claims. 
 
Even if the governance benefit of a legal rule is greater than its enforcement cost, 
there may still be an incentive to waive it if the differential between governance 
benefits and enforcement costs is not sufficiently large.  Again, suppose that parties 
are involved in repeat dealings.  Any party that breaches the rule would be punished 
by a refusal by the other party to deal with him.  Since punishment by tit-for-tat 
                                                 
3 Compensation could take the form of an implicit understanding that if you ignore the slight harms I 
inflict on you, I will ignore the slight harms you inflict on me.  Alternatively, one of the parties might 
agree to some concession to the other party, with an implicit understanding that the other party will 
not litigate over some issue in the future.  On the adoption of norms (sometimes involving the waiver 
of strict rights) that deviate from the explicit law, see Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How 
Neighbors Settle Disputes, Harvard Univ, Press, 1991. 
4 A rough statement of the Coase theorem is as follows: if transaction costs are low, parties will find 
side payments that will lead them to adopt the most efficient allocation of resources.  See R. H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
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refusals to deal or through group ostracism may be an effective means of enforcing 
group norms, the parties may decide to waive the legal rule.5  The legal rule, in this 
scenario, provides insubstantial incremental governance benefits, while at the same 
time introducing a substantial enforcement cost. 
 
The same considerations that go into the decision to waive a legal right go into the 
decision to arbitrate.  Arbitration provides an alternative forum in which parties can 
structure rules and enforcement methods so that the difference between governance 
benefits and enforcement costs is larger than in the default regime represented by 
ordinary courts.  Why might the difference between governance benefits and 
enforcement costs be larger under arbitration than in the court system?  There are 
several possible reasons. 
 
First, one might find that the governance benefits associated with a given rule can be 
enhanced by moving into the arbitration regime.  Suppose, for example, that a court 
is likely to make mistakes when deciding whether a group norm was violated.  If the 
court is likely to make mistakes, the governance benefits associated with that 
particular rule could be enhanced by having it enforced in a regime in which 
adjudication is more accurate.6  Under a more accurate regime, people who were 
innocent of violating the norm would have less reason to fear that they would be 
punished by mistake, and people who had violated the norm would have less reason 
to expect that they would escape punishment.  To return to the web analogy that I 
began with, the arbitration regime may be one in which the norm-enforcer swings his 
hammer more accurately than under the court regime. 
 
Second, even if the governance benefits from a particular rule are the same within 
the court regime and within arbitration, a group might find that the enforcement cost 
is much lower within arbitration.  For example, with a more accurate set of decision 
makers, the parties might find that the evidentiary burdens of proving their 
arguments in court are lower under the arbitration regime.   Thus, even if there are no 
governance benefits associated with enhanced accuracy, there may be substantial 
enforcement cost savings.  In addition, the arbitration regime may be able to develop 
a special efficiency or productivity in considering disputes of a given nature.  This 
will reduce the cost of enforcement for claims falling within its ambit. 
 
Third, one should note there is a close connection between enforcement costs and 
governance benefits.  An increase in enforcement costs can reduce governance 
benefits.  If the cost of enforcing is too high relative to the private benefit a litigant 
gets from bringing suit, he will drop his claim.  But that means rule-violators whose 
victims fall within this group are effectively shielded from the law.  They will 
continue to act in a socially undesirable manner.  It follows that an arbitration regime 
                                                 
5 For such a waiver to occur, it is not necessary for the parties to get together and sign a formal waiver 
contract.  They may decide to conduct their affairs, as Ellickson found in Shasta County, without 
resort to lawsuits.  See Ellickson, supra note __. 
6 Hylton, supra note 1, Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. 
Leg. Studies 1(1995). 
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may enhance governance benefits simply by introducing a cheaper method of claim 
enforcement. 
 
Congestion provides an important reason why arbitration agreements may involve 
cheaper enforcement costs than the court regime.  Congestion in ordinary courts 
makes it less likely that any court will have the time or resources to match the level 
of accuracy in adjudication that repeat-dealers are likely to desire.  Congestion also 
introduces delay, which increases the cost of enforcement.  Given these costs, it is 
quite plausible that sophisticated parties who are repeat dealers will prefer to set up 
their own arbitration regime rather than submit all of their disputes to the courts.  Of 
course, this preference may not be put into effect because it is costly to set up an 
arbitration regime.  And to do so involves foregoing some of the governance benefits 
already provided by courts. 
 
One well known argument against the contractualist approach taken here points to 
the importance of external effects.  According to the argument, arbitration may be 
socially undesirable because it reduces the stock of publicly accessible legal rules, 
and stunts the development of law.7  It follows from this argument that an individual, 
or group, may be too quick from a social standpoint to commit their disputes to 
arbitration.  The reason is that they fail to take into account the benefits externalized 
to others when they litigate in the courts. 
 
The externality critique of arbitration raises potentially important issues, but there 
are reasons to doubt the importance of the issues too.  If the argument is understood 
as opposing any agreements that divert disputes away from a final judgment in court, 
including settlement agreements, then it must be regarded as an untenable position.  
Settlements tend to occur when the law is relatively clear, and neither party has a 
desire to seek to change it.  Banning settlements will therefore do little to enhance 
the stock of publicly accessible legal rules.8  If the argument is understood as 
opposing only arbitration agreements, then its concerns could be met by requiring 
that the law developed within arbitration be made publicly accessible, rather than 
banning arbitration altogether.  In addition, parties opt for arbitration in some cases 
to secure enhanced governance benefits.  In such cases, the gains to the parties will 
be substantial while the external costs imposed on others are likely to be trivial and 
remote.9 
 
Much of the foregoing argument depends on the ability of parties to make intelligent 
choices.  The most obvious case in which this does not hold is that of mandatory 
                                                 
7 For the most general source for such arguments, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 
1073 (1984).  For the argument applied to arbitration, see Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and 
the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1059 (1987). 
8 Hylton, supra note 1, at 244. 
9 Id. at 245-47.  Of course, in the final analysis, the externality critique of arbitration raises issues that 
should be resolved by examining empirical evidence.  The arguments in the text merely show that the 
externality critique is not persuasive on theoretical grounds.  What if the externality critique cannot be 
evaluated empirically?  Then the critique should be viewed as a purely speculative argument that 
awaits some empirical verification. 
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arbitration.  I am not using the term “mandatory arbitration” to refer to arbitration 
contracts in the employment setting, as many writers do.  I refer to state-mandated 
regimes that require litigating parties to go into arbitration before entering the 
courts.10  There is no guarantee in the case of state-mandated arbitration that 
arbitration will go into effect when and only when the difference between 
governance benefits and enforcement costs is greater within arbitration than in the 
courts.  Indeed, mandatory arbitration may have the perverse effect of driving up the 
overall cost of litigation,11 as litigants realize that in order to pursue their claims, 
they may have to go through arbitration, and then into the courts.  This realization 
may lead potential claimants to drop their claims, which in effect provides an 
immunity shield to rule violators. 
 
The other case in which real choice might not be observed is that of the so-called 
adhesion contract.  I refer to contracts in which one of the parties is offered a take-it-
or-leave it standard form and may be effectively uninformed about the terms of the 
deal.  He signs the form because he feels in some sense coerced to sign.  If one of the 
parties signs an agreement to arbitrate without being aware of the terms of the deal, 
he may find that he has entered a regime in which the governance benefits, for him, 
disappear entirely. 
 
However, the adhesion contract theory must be viewed as a theory or hypothesis and 
not much more.  People sign take-it-or-leave-it contracts all the time without being 
fully aware of all of the terms of the deal.  We often rely on what we see of the 
experiences of others.  We see that a neighbor bought a high-tech refrigerator, and it 
works quite well.  We decide on the basis of that neighbor’s experience to buy one 
ourselves.  Or we rely on the reports provided by consumers to a neutral source.  The 
mere fact that someone signs a contract without being aware of all of its terms does 
not tell us whether the provisions of the contract were, or whether any particular 
provision of the contract was, a bad or good deal. 
 
The mere fact that an arbitration agreement appears as a take-it-or-leave-it provision 
of a contract does not tell whether or not the offeree signed the contract based on a 
reasonably informed choice over his alternatives.  Nor does it tell us whether or not 
the offeree gained an ex ante benefit from signing the contract.  If he gained a benefit 
from signing the contract, and had reason to expect that he would, he should be held 
to his agreement in most cases. 
 
                                                 
10 Many states have enacted statutes requiring arbitration for certain types of civil disputes before a 
trial.  States requiring arbitration in at least some circumstances include Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington.  See Lucy Katz, Compulsory 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two-Sides of the Coin?, J. 
Disp. Resol. 1, fn.37 (1993). For an empirical analysis of one type of state-mandated arbitration, see 
Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5 Am. 
Law & Econ. Rev. 61 (2003). 
11 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal 
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169 (1993). 
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Whether arbitration agreements specified in adhesion contracts are socially 
undesirable is an empirical question.12  Given this, the argument against arbitration 
contracts framed in adhesion contracts should be taken as a hypothesis to be tested. 
The question to test is as follows: if we confine ourselves to contracts of adhesion, is 
the difference between governance benefits and enforcement costs lower for 
arbitration than for the courts?  Until someone answers this question, the argument 
for banning arbitration agreements set out in take-it-or-leave-it contracts is based on 
speculation. 
 
II. Empirical Evidence  
 
Now let’s consider the empirical evidence.  As far as I am aware, few studies have 
attempted to find evidence of governance benefits from arbitration.  Most empirical 
studies in this area examine the results of arbitration – e.g., damage awards and 
plaintiff win rates.13  Perhaps the most careful of the recent studies is one by 
Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill.14 
 
Eisenberg and Hill present empirical evidence on the results of non-civil rights 
employment disputes heard by courts and by arbitrators.  They find that for high-pay 
employees (more than $65,000 per year) the outcomes from arbitration and litigation 
are the same.15  The win rates and mean damage awards are roughly equal in their 
samples of arbitrated and litigated cases.16  However, they also find a substantial 
plaintiff win rate (40 percent) for claims brought by low-pay employees in 
arbitration.  In addition, in the sample used by Eisenberg and Hill, the total number 
of claims taken into arbitration by low-pay employees (88) exceeds the total number 
of claims taken into arbitration by high-pay employees (77).17 
 
In interpreting Eisenberg and Hill’s results, one should keep in mind that very few 
low-pay employees bring employment disputes into court.  As they note in their 
paper, most attorneys say that the damage award must be at least $60,000 in order to 
cover the costs of litigation.18  Most low-pay employees are unable to find an 
attorney willing to prosecute their claim. 
 
                                                 
12 For a detailed examination of the issues, see Ware, Stephen J., "Paying the Price of Process: 
Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreement" . http://ssrn.com/abstract=264122 
(forthcoming, Journal of Dispute Resolution). 
13 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Employee Rights 
& Employment Policy journal, 189 (1997); William Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment 
Discrimination, Dispute Resolution Journal, 40, Oct-Dec 1995. 
14 Eisenberg, Theodore and Hill, Elizabeth T., "Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical 
Comparison" (March 5, 2003). NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 65; Cornell Law 
School Working Paper. http://ssrn.com/abstract=389780.  For a closely related paper, see Elizabeth 
Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices 
of the American Arbitration Association, 18 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 777 (2003). 
15 Eisenberg and Hill, at 14-19. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 14.  
18 Id. at 10. 
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Keeping this fact in mind, the Eisenberg and Hill results suggest that arbitration may 
provide substantial governance benefits in the workplace.  If high-pay employees are 
receiving roughly the same treatment in arbitration as they get in court, and low-pay 
employees are able to pursue claims that would otherwise never gain the attention of 
a competent lawyer, then the total number of claims against employers must be 
larger under arbitration.  This suggests that the governance benefits are larger under 
arbitration, at least in the area of non-civil rights employment claims.  Moreover, the 
issues that are of special concern to low-pay employees are more likely to be 
addressed in arbitration.  
 
The only paper to look directly for evidence of substantial governance benefits in 
connection to arbitration is one that I coauthored with Chris Drahozal.19  Our study 
examines franchise contracts, many of which include arbitration provisions.  We 
examined the factors that determine the presence of arbitration provision in a 
franchise contract.  Our results show that the traditional factors cited in the franchise 
literature as important aspects of governance have a substantial affect on the 
likelihood of an arbitration provision being present in the franchise contract. 
 
To understand the results of my study with Chris Drahozal, it is helpful first to 
consider one of the fundamental results of the literature on the economics of 
franchise contracts.20  One key result is that the franchisee has an incentive under 
certain circumstances to “free ride” on the brand capital of the franchisor.  For 
example, consider McDonald’s.  If an individual McDonald’s franchisor cuts its 
costs and at the same time lowers the quality of its product, the franchisor will enjoy 
the full benefit of the cost reduction while externalizing the reputational harm to 
other business units in the chain.21  That is because many of the customers view each 
McDonald’s outlet as interchangeable, and associate any negative experience in 
quality with the whole enterprise.  Given this, one of the major governance problems 
present in any franchise contract is discouraging franchisees from free-riding on the 
franchisor’s brand. 
 
One empirical measure of the incentive to free ride is the percentage of business 
units owned by the franchisor.  As that percentage increases, the incentive to free 
ride falls.  That is because as more business units are owned by the franchisor itself, 
the less likely it is that any individual business unit will think that it can externalize 
any reduction in quality to other units in the chain. 
 
Chris Drahozal and I found that the percentage of company owned units in a 
franchise is negatively associated with the probability of an arbitration clause being 
                                                 
19 Christopher R. Drahozal and Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An 
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. Legal Studies 549 (2003). 
20 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J. Law 
&Econ 223 (1978). 
21 For example, McDonald’s has a rule governing the number of minutes that a cooked hamburger can 
sit waiting for a customer to purchase it before it must be thrown out.  An individual franchisor could 
cut its cost by violating the rule.  However, many customers, who are often travelers, will attribute the 
bad experience to the whole franchise. 
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present in the franchise contract.22  If arbitration provides governance benefits, as we 
hypothesize, this result would make sense.  For on the theory that arbitration 
provides substantial governance benefits, it should be more important to have an 
arbitration provision as the likelihood of a dispute over free riding increases.  And 
our findings show just such a correlation.  As the likelihood of a dispute over free 
riding increases (which happens as the percentage of company-owned units falls) the 
likelihood of an arbitration provision in the franchise contract also increases. 
 
The finding of a statistically significant, negative correlation between the percentage 
of company-owned units in a franchise network and the probability of an arbitration 
clause appearing in the franchise contract suggests that arbitration enhanced 
governance benefits in the sample of franchise contracts that Chris Drahozal and I 
studied.  The likely reason for this is that arbitration provides a forum in which 
industry experts can determine whether a franchisee’s conduct should be considered 
a valid basis for termination of the franchise contract.  The alternative forum for 
deciding this question, the courts, would ask a jury to answer this question.  Given 
the large number of ways in which a franchisee could appear to be complying with 
the provisions of a franchise contract while at the same time violating contract 
norms, it is quite plausible that arbitration provides a more accurate forum for 
determining whether the franchisor had a valid basis for terminating a contract. 
 
We also found evidence that arbitration provisions are designed to avoid over-
deterrence from excessive litigation and to minimize enforcement costs.  For 
example, we found that the likelihood of an arbitration provision jumps substantially 
if the parties have included a contract provision limiting punitive damage awards.23  
That suggests that if the franchisor is concerned that terminated franchisees will go 
to court to seek large punitive damages, they are especially likely to try to avoid that 
outcome by seeking to channel their disputes into arbitration.  In addition, we found 
that franchisors whose home offices were located in a litigious jurisdiction were 
more likely to seek arbitration than other franchisors.24 
 
The empirical evidence reviewed here suggests that governance benefits are an 
important reason that we see arbitration agreements.  This has important implications 
for the public debate on arbitration. 
 
First, the finding that governance benefits provide a major reason for arbitration 
agreements goes against the oft-repeated view that arbitration contracts operate in 
effect as waivers.  In other words, the oft-repeated view is that potential plaintiffs 
sign away their legal rights when they enter into arbitration regimes.  However, the 
Eisenberg and Hill and Drahozal and Hylton studies suggest that arbitration contracts 
do not operate as waiver agreements.  To the extent they enhance governance 
benefits, they enhance at least some legal rights. 
 
                                                 
22 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 18, at 575. 
23 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 18, at 574. 
24 Id. 
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Second, the empirical results on arbitration and governance benefits suggest that the 
benefits of arbitration are more widespread than typically thought.  If arbitration 
agreements involved nothing more than the waiver of rights, they would provide few 
if any social benefits, because they would simply redistribute costs.  In addition, if 
arbitration agreements simply reduced litigation costs, they would be beneficial, but 
in a limited sense connected to litigation.  The finding that they enhance governance 
benefits suggests that they result in organizations working more effectively on a day-
to-day basis.  For example, if arbitration agreements enhance governance benefits in 
franchise networks, then they probably reduce the risk of free riding behavior within 
these networks.  Reducing the frequency of free riding leads, in turn, to more 
reliable, effective franchises. 
 
I do not wish to be understood as providing an unqualified defense of arbitration 
agreements.  Of course it is possible for arbitration agreements to reduce the overall 
welfare of the contracting parties, or of society in general.25  But that is also true of 
litigation – it may or may not enhance society’s welfare.26  The theory of litigation 
and arbitration has reached the stage where it is beginning to suggest useful 
empirical tests of the social value of arbitration.  The empirical evidence on 
arbitration agreements remains sparse, and much more work needs to be done in this 
area.  I am hopeful that policy debates concerning arbitration will soon be informed 
by solid empirical research rather than speculation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Hylton, supra note 1. 
26 Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit, 11 J. Leg. Studies 333 
(1982). 
